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What does it mean when we say we can see 
colours? How do we use them and how do we learn their 
names? It is not at all clear whether we all experience the 
same colour when looking at the same red rose. 
Nevertheless we use the same word and we do 
understand it when someone else does. We know that red 
and yellow make orange and that blue and yellow make 
green, but can we imagine a reddishgreen or a 
yellowishblue? And why haven’t we got a concept of a 
white transparent glass? 
The problem of colour-incompatibility runs 
throughout Wittgenstein’s work from Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (TLP) until On Certainty (OC) and describes 
a development from ‘logic’ to ‘grammar’ and ‘form of life’. 
This problem of colour-incompatibility and Wittgenstein’s 
other remarks on colour have been discussed through the 
years in several ways (see Literature). In my opinion all 
these approaches miss a crucial point. 
My point is that Wittgenstein is not so much 
concerned with colours as such, as with our ability to see 
(that implies both seeing ánd thinking) and our capacity to 
imagine something. For he links the grammar of colour to 
the grammar of language through the notion of ‘seeing 
aspects’: a topic he elaborates extensively in Philosophical 
Investigations (PI) part II,xi. He relates this notion on the 
one hand to the colour-octahedron in Philosophical 
Remarks (PR) and on the other hand to the remarks on 
colour in Remarks on Colour (RC). Wittgenstein asks 
questions like: Why haven’t we got a word  for a white 
colour that is fully transparent? We could speak of 
something white and transparent as being ‘colourless’, but 
does this term still fall under our notion of colour-concept? 
It seems that we cannot think of the conceptcombination 
‘white water’, because we are not able to describe how 
something ‘white and transparent’ should look like (cf. RC 
I-23). What are the limits of our power of imagination?  
 
2. Colour 
In my opinion Wittgenstein has deliberately chosen 
for the colour-octahedron as a 3dimensional model in 
order to clarify some of the problems concerning the 
‘colour grammar’, as he also deliberately has left aside the 
colour-wheel or Runge’s colour-sphere in his investigations 
(cf. Gerritsen 1984 and www.colorsystem.com for an 
extensive overview of coloursystems). Wittgenstein adapts 
the model of the colour-octahedron from Höfler (Rotthaupt 
1996), who follows Hering taking as point of departure the 
so-called ‘opponent classification’ (in its modern form 
proposed by Hurvich and Jameson 1957). This 
classification can be seen as a kind of reversal process 
according to the formula: red – green, blue – yellow, white 
– black. Here the basic colour pairs are situated in the 
model at opposite points. Therefore green is not a mixed 
colour in this model, but a basic colour. All basic colours 
are situated on an unambiguous point at the corners of the 
base; the white-black axis is at right angles to this base.  
 
             
 
 
Höfler – 1883 (Gerritsen 1984:38) Wittgenstein – 1930 
(PR-XXI §221) 
 
When we compare Höfler’s octahedron with the 
one Wittgenstein has drawn, it can be noticed that 
Wittgenstein is concerned to open up the ‘logical structure’ 
constructed by the relationships of the colours. This logical 
structure represents the colour-space in which the rules 
are laid down: the ‘grammar of colour’. It is important to 
read Wittgenstein’s colour-octahedron as literally as 
possible, because only then we can discover why he 
extended the white-black axis a little upward and 
downward. In my view he wants to draw with this extension 
our attention to the fact that this coordinate is situated in a 
different dimension. This has consequences.  
In the first place this so called grey-scale can be 
seen as an overview of the mixed colours of white and 
black, but also as a scale of colours between white and 
black. Secondly in this way can be shown that all saturated 
colours can be mixed with white, grey tones and black. In 
that sense the saturated colours (not only the four basic 
colours) are situated between the opponent pair of white 
and black. In this respect the oppositions white – yellow – 
black and red – yellow – green for example have the same 
structure. The third and most important point Wittgenstein 
keeps returning on in RC is the fact that we cannot speak 
of transparent colours in case of this white-black 
coordinate. According to this model we cannot speak of a 
transparent white, nor of a transparent grey or black; and 
that we can observe immediately and ‘in one clear view’ 




due to the fact that this coordinate is situated in a different 
dimension. A transparent white would have to lay on a 
point of one of the lines of the base (cf. RC III-85 and 178). 
Another point we can make by comparing the two 
models is that Wittgenstein has left out the cross inside the 
base. In doing this he shows us that we can not make a 
combination with red and green as ‘reddishgreen’ and no 
combination with yellow and blue as ‘yellowishblue’.  On 
the other hand he divides this square base towards the 
outside into a regular octagon where he situates the mixed 
colours ‘somewhere’ between the basic colours. Between 
these different colours lots of mixed colours can be seen 
each of them more or less tending towards one of the 
basic colours; that is greener or more red or even móre 
red, reddish yellow or bluish green etc. There are no sharp 
boundaries between the different categories; they are fluid 
terms we use in daily life in an in principle unlimited variety 
of cases.  
The colour-octahedron is a 3dimensional model 
capable of showing two dimensions of the colours: the 
dimension of the four basic colours and their mixed colours 
on the square base, that can be opaque or transparent in 
reality, and the dimension at right angles: the white-black 
axis the one we can only think opaque. In every day life we 
deal not only with these two dimensions of the colour-
octahedron as being an idealized system but also with a 
depth dimension. This depth dimension shows itself as a 
4th dimension in the reflection, the glittering and shining, 
and the transparency of the colours (cf. Z 269). 
Also in the discovery of the depth dimension 
Wittgenstein is concerned with the ‘logic’ (that is the 
grammar) of colour-concepts; he connects this discovery 
with the ambiguity of colour. Therefore he wonders in RC 
for example in what ways we differentiate between a trans-
parent representation ‘in a painting’ and the opaque 
colours ‘on the palette’. And why is it that there can be a 
transparent green, but no transparent white? Why don’t we 
have a word for a white colour that is transparent? And 
when we call it ‘colourless’, does this word still belong to 
our notion of colour-concept? What is more: when a 
colour-concept – for example ‘white’ (as a colour-patch) – 
or ‘transparent’ (as a colour-space) – occurs in just one of 
the colour geometries: the octahedron or the 4th dimension 
– how do we connect these two colour geometries? We 
could try to neutralize this sort of differences by creating an 
equal standard, for instance by reducing them to colour-
samples as we know from the Munsell system. In that way 
we are able to compare the two different colour concepts, 
but only at the expense of the depth dimension. For then 
we can not differentiate anymore between colour-patch 
and colour-space (RC I-25). 
 
3. Seeing colours and aspects 
We can ‘see something now as luminous, now as 
grey’ (RC I-38). It is characteristic of Wittgenstein that he 
links the phenomenon of seeing aspects, investigated in PI 
II,xi with his inquiries on colour concerning the colour-
octahedron in PR and the colour-puzzles in RC. He 
discovers that seeing aspects is involved in vagueness 
and in an ambiguity of the notion of ‘seeing’. By taking into 
account this notion of seeing Wittgenstein is able to extend 
his grammatical investigations into the broader context of a 
form of life.  
In order to differentiate between the surface 
dimension and the depth dimension of colours it is not 
sufficient that we make comparisons the way we do when 
we call a colour ‘pure red’ the moment we compare that 
colour with other reds in a same situation. There is no use 
in comparing between <’colour of gold’ or ‘colour of silver’> 
and < ‘yellow’ or ‘grey’> (cf. RC III-241). They each belong 
to a different  logical (grammatical) category.  We can only 
get access to the depth dimension of the colours when we 
are able to make an aspect-change. We see black now as 
a surface colour now as ‘deep’ or ‘reflecting’.  Depending 
on the context we see the spot now as ‘white’ now as 
‘grey’.  The change of aspect itself is sharply defined, but 
the colour-concepts that are involved in that aspect change 
are ambiguous and context dependent.  
Not only in the differentiation of surface and depth 
dimension do we make use of aspect- change. Also in 
case of the colour-octahedron Wittgenstein asks us to 
utilize this ability. According to him the colour-octahedron 
is a perspicuous representation – übersichtliche Dar-
stellung – of the colour grammar (cf. PR I-II). This concept 
of ‘übersichtliche Darstellung’ characterizes our form of 
representation, the way we look at things (PI 122). The 
model of the colour-octahedron shows us the rules, the 
connections, we refer to in making decisions concerning 
the grammar of the colours. Different combinations of the 
same grammatical rules are possible and some of them 
can relate to different objects of comparison. Think for 
example of the fact that red is a colour situated between 
violet and orange and also between blue and yellow, but is 
not a mixed colour of violet and orange or blue and yellow. 
Nevertheless red is the common part of violet and orange. 
These manners of expression have the advantage that 
they show us in what ways the colours are defined. How-
ever: nothing fixes the rules for ever. The printer or the 
photographer make use of quite another system than the 
designer or the decorator. 
The purpose of this kind of graphic, 3dimensional 
and visual model such as the colour-octahedron is to 
create a change of aspect by illuminating a new application 
of our words. In his later work Wittgenstein holds that the 
octahedron, the colour-samples (PI 1) or the standard 
metre in Paris (PI 50) fulfil a special role in our every day 
use and get their meaning only in a practice. It is in inter-
action with the context and with the possibility of making 
analogies with situations in concrete practices that these 
models (also) make meaning possible.  The colour-
octahedron for instance is an übersichtliche Darstellung for 
a certain part of the colour grammar, but falls short in 
representing the depth dimension of the colours. It is not 
so much suited for the arrangement but for an 
arrangement (cf. PI 132). We only can describe the 
glittering, reflection or transparency of a colour within the 
broader context in which they appear. This context brings 
them to life so to speak. 
Wittgenstein repeatedly takes the glittering and the 
reflection as a subject of inquiry in his colour-puzzles in 
order to illuminate on the one hand the similarities and 
differences between those two concepts and on the other 
hand to show the connection with transparency. The 
differences between ‘black’ and ‘dark’ and between 
‘cloudiness’ (opaque) and ‘deep’ (transparent). The 
concept ‘white’ related to transparency, glittering, the 
relation white – grey and ‘white’ related to ‘substance 
colour’. The investigation into ‘white’ and  ‘grey’ is con-
nected with surroundings, like the different ways of 
illumination that make a colour-spot on  one time appear 
as white, the other time as grey. The incidence of light 
seems to make a colour look differently; but does not make 
it different. 
Our conceptual domain is fluid and flexible; 
Wittgenstein suggests that we could even invent a natural 
history. A totally different world would imply totally different 
concepts. He draws our attention to experiments that have 
the form of ‘trying to imagine something’ by means of the 




colour-puzzles (PR and RC) and the perception-puzzles 
(PI II,xi). Seeing aspects asks for the power and the ability 
of  imagination. The answer to the question why we cannot 
think of a ‘fully transparent white’ is as simple as it is 
compelling: the expression ‘transparent white’ does not fit 
into our form of life, our picture of the world. We just have 
no use for it. When we have to name it, we call it ‘colour-
less’, but then it is not at all clear whether this expression 
still falls under our concept of colour (cf. PI 115 and RC III-
210, 217). It is our picture of the world that is constitutive 
for our convictions and our language. It is the inherited 




Apparently we have words for things that do not 
exist in reality: words like ‘grey-glowing’ or ‘illuminating-
grey’ have no representation in reality. In addition we 
cannot find any words for things that do exist in reality: 
every painter knows that making a transparent white is no 
problem at all. A handful of flour thrown in a bucket full of 
water and there we have a beautiful transparent white. Yet 
we cannot think a transparent white! From this angle we 
can say that the investigations concerning the colours is an 
investigation that has the limits of our thinking, of our 
imagination in its centre. The scope of our ability to 
discover new links by means of seeing aspects implies the 
scope of our imagination. This scope is related to our form 
of life. In this respect the investigations of Wittgenstein 
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